Christos A. Ioannou

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Short Bio
I am a Full Professor (Professeur des Universités) at the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and a Research Fellow at the Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (since 2019).

I graduated in May of 2009 with a Ph.D in Economics from the University of Minnesota under the supervision of Aldo Rustichini.

I am an applied game theorist interested in modeling economic behavior; in particular, I am intrigued by the study of behavior that deviates from perfect rationality. I thus employ laboratory and field experiments to better understand (and model) economic decision-making and its psychological underpinnings in strategic games.

For more information on my research, click here.

 

New Research
Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence coauthored with Spyros Galanis and Stelios Kotronis is a new working paper that investigates information aggregation in a dynamic trading model with partially informed and ambiguity averse traders. We first show theoretically and experimentally that the separable securities, introduced by Ostrovsky (2012), do not aggregate information and are prone to manipulation. We then define a new class of strongly separable securities which are robust to the above considerations, and show that they characterize information aggregation in both strategic and non-strategic environments.


 This website was last updated on June 20, 2019.