Christos A. Ioannou

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Short Bio
I am a Full Professor (Professeur des Universités) in Economics at the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and a Research Fellow at the Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (since 2019). I graduated in 2009 with a Ph.D in Economics from the University of Minnesota under the supervision of Aldo Rustichini. Since 2021, I am also a member in the Council of the Cyprus Agency of Quality Assurance & Acceditation in Higher Education.

I am an applied game theorist interested in modelling economic behavior; in particular, I am intrigued by the study of behavior that deviates from perfect rationality. I thus employ experiments to collect data, which I analyze to better understand (and model) economic decision-making. Over the years, my research interests have spanned from an analysis and modelling of behavior in repeated games to that in prediction markets.

New Research
Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence coauthored with Spyros Galanis and Stelios Kotronis investigates information aggregation in a dynamic trading model. We show theoretically and confirm experimentally that the separable securities, introduced by Ostrovsky (2012), do not aggregate information and are prone to manipulation with partially informed and ambiguity averse traders. We define a new class of strongly separable securities, which are robust to the above considerations, and show that they characterize information aggregation in both strategic and non-strategic environments. Finally, we show theoretically that strongly separable securities are both sufficient and necessary for information aggregation, but, strikingly, there does not exist a security that is strongly separable for all information structures.

AAPG2021 Projet de Recherche Collaborative (PRC)
I was recently awarded a grant from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) in France to work on a project titled Bounded Rationality in Prediction Markets. More information on this project and the upcoming workshop in Paris can be found here.

The website was updated on August 25, 2024